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A B S T R A C T
In a recent paper (Khokhlov, 2016), a protocol was proposed for using weak measurement to
attack BB84. This claimed the four basis states typically used could be perfectly discriminated,
and so an interceptor could obtain all information carried. We show this attack fails when
considered using standard quantum mechanics, as expected — such ‘‘single-shot’’ quantum state
discrimination is impossible, even using weak measurement.
In his recent paper, Khoklhov claims to have developed a protocol that can be used to distinguish between the four basis states
sed in BB84 to encode information — the 𝐻-, 𝑉 -, 𝐷- and 𝐴-polarised states of a single photon [1]. He claims this is through weak
easurement — where weak coupling of a quantum variable to an ancilla allows data about a quantum state to be obtained without
ollapsing the state. However, weak measurement typically only obtains a small amount of information per measurement, so a large
umber of identically-prepared quantum objects are needed to obtain this fully. An alternative proposal given by Aharonov et al.
iscusses the possibility of performing a weak measurement on a single particle [2] - however, this is still subject to Busch’s limit
n information gained for a given disturbance [3].
Khoklhov previously gave an interferometric device that he claims allows a weak measurement to tell the path a photon travelled
ia, without disturbing the state of that photon (see Fig. 1a) [4]. For this, a photon of state 𝛼|𝐻⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ⟩ goes through a polarising
eamsplitter (PBS), which transmits 𝐻- and reflects 𝑉 -polarised components. The two components each travel down a respective
rm, where they have a momentum-kick applied to them, such that their eventual arrival position on the second PBS is not affected —
ere, the 𝐻-component gets a downwards kick, and the 𝑉 -component an upwards kick. The two components meet at the second PBS,
ecombine, and then exit, but the difference in momentum allows, at a far distance from the second PBS, the respective components
o be identified. Khoklhov claims, by using many photons, this allows the probability amplitudes of the two polarisation components
o be determined, and so the preparation state (in truth, we only get the moduli-squared of those components, and so the classical
alance of probabilities). Further, Khoklhov implies that the photon emitted into one of the two distinguishable far-field paths would
till be in its original state, rather than collapsed to either 𝐻 or 𝑉 . This is also incorrect – as the polarisation becomes entangled with
he momentum degree-of-freedom, the collapse to either upwards – or downwards-momentum causes the simultaneous collapse to
ither 𝐻- or 𝑉 -polarisation.
In this paper, Khoklov then makes the bold claim that, using these single-interferometer units as building blocks, he can make
device which can perfectly distinguish between the four basis states used in BB84 - 𝐻 , 𝑉 , 𝐷 (or 𝐻+𝑉√
2
) and 𝐴 (or 𝐻−𝑉√
2
). Given
he security of BB84 rests on the quantum assumption that, even with an optimal choice of measuring basis, one cannot distinguish
etween all four bases perfectly (thus bounding an eavesdropper’s potential knowledge), this claim threatens the security of one of
he most well-known QKD protocols.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jonte.hance@bristol.ac.uk (J. Hance).vailable online 17 June 2021
030-4026/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijleo.2021.167451
eceived 13 January 2021; Received in revised form 9 June 2021; Accepted 12 June 2021
Optik 243 (2021) 167451J. Hance and J. Rarity
d
d
Fig. 1. Diagrams of (a) the single-interferometer device, which forms the building blocks of the attack protocol, and (b) the layout formed of these, where each
red square is an interferometer of the sort given in a. As can be seen, once initially split by the first interferometer, the 𝐻 and 𝑉 components remain these
separate components, and so never travel the paths marked X. Therefore, only two of the four detectors ever receive photons, making the protocol useless for
determining the full initial state for a single photon.
Khoklhov claims this is possible by taking the separated outputs of one of his single-interferometer devices, then putting each
output through another device. Those outputs which disagree with their original polarisation-determination (due to his assumption
that the photon exits in its original state) are then combined — the components which agree with their original polarisation are
put through another device, and again have any further outputs which disagree combined. The combined beam is then put through
a polarising beamsplitter in the 𝐴 − 𝐷 basis, with its two outputs sent to detectors, alongside the other two outputs (that always
agreed with their initially-determined polarisation). We present this in Fig. 1b. Khoklhov claims that if the input photon’s initial
state is 𝐷 (𝐴) it will end up in the inner left (right) detector. This claim is false.
Let us examine the path of the input photon using standard quantum mechanics (as represented by Bra-Ket notation). We
can describe the action of one of Khoklhov’s single-interferometer devices (pre-detection), as given in Fig. 1a, on a single
polarisation-encoded photon qubit by
𝛼|𝐻⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ⟩ → 𝛼|𝐻, ↓⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 , ↑⟩ (1)
This effectively entangles the polarisation and path degrees of freedom. Applying this to the larger set-up (as given in Fig. 1b),
we then see the two components (𝐻 and 𝑉 ) then act as separate for the remainder of the chain, obeying
𝛼|𝐻⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ⟩ → 𝛼|𝐻,𝑅,𝑅,𝑅⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ,𝐿,𝐿, 𝐿⟩ (2)
where 𝐿 and 𝑅 describe the paths on the figure after each interferometer. This means the inner paths, |𝑅,𝐿⟩, |𝐿,𝑅⟩, |𝐿,𝐿,𝑅⟩ and
|𝑅,𝑅,𝐿⟩ are never explored, so the two inner detectors never click. Given the determination of the single photon’s polarisation qubit




), this shows the attack
oes not work — as expected, standard quantum mechanics preserves the security of BB84 from this attack.
We finally give a more proper account of the result of using true weak measurements to attempt Khoklhov’s scheme, using the
escription of weak measurement from [5].
To do this, in each of Khoklhov’s apparatuses, we couple our photon’s polarisation
|𝜓⟩ ∈ {|𝐻⟩; |𝑉 ⟩;








= 𝛼|𝐻⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ⟩
(3)
with the pointer (the photon’s momentum)
|𝜙⟩ = |𝜙𝑑⟩ = ∫𝑝
𝜙(𝑝)|𝑝⟩𝑑𝑝 (4)
where 𝑝 is the vertical momentum of the photon. 𝑃𝑑 is the momentum operator such that 𝑃𝑑 |𝑝⟩ = 𝑝|𝑝⟩.





If we define the polarisation-distinguishing operator
?̂? = |𝐻⟩⟨𝐻| − |𝑉 ⟩⟨𝑉 | (6)2
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we can consider an interaction Hamiltonian between the two
?̂?𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑡)?̂? ⊗ ?̂?𝑑 (7)




𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 1 (8)
or coupling time 𝑇 .
This means, applying this Hamiltonian
𝑒𝑖?̂?𝑡∕ℏ|𝜓⟩⊗ |𝜙⟩ (9)
e see for each of |𝐻⟩⊗ |𝜙(𝑝)⟩, |𝑉 ⟩⊗ |𝜙(𝑝)⟩, the Hamiltonian takes 𝑃𝑑 to 𝑃𝑑 + 1, 𝑃𝑑 − 1 respectively, as





[?̂?, 𝑃𝑑 ]𝑑𝑡 ∈ {+1,−1} (10)
Therefore, the corresponding transformation is
𝑒𝑖?̂?𝑡∕ℏ|𝜓⟩⊗ |𝜙(𝑝)⟩
= 𝛼|𝐻⟩⊗ |𝜙(𝑝 − 1)⟩ + 𝛽|𝑉 ⟩⊗ |𝜙(𝑝 + 1)⟩
= ∫𝑝
(




The above wavefunctions 𝜙(𝑝 − 1) and 𝜙(𝑝 + 1) need to overlap each other for the measurement to be weak — and so need to
have high variance, 𝜎. The higher the variance, the weaker the measurement — if these Gaussian wavefunctions do not overlap,
them the measurement is strong. Given 𝜎 is initially defined from the vertical momentum of the photon, this means the photon
input into the system must also have high 𝜎.
The effect of the strength of the measurement can be most readily seen when observe and collapse the pointer to a specific











where both the coefficients on |𝐻⟩ and |𝑉 ⟩ are biased slightly depending on where they are in relation to 𝑝0. This makes sense,
analogous to how measuring an eigenvalue for an observable collapses the measured state to the relevant eigenstate — the only
difference here is the variance 𝜎 providing some uncertainty in that measurement.
The far-field vertical position of the photon will depend on the vertical momentum of the photon, as Khoklhov rightly says.
However, the variance in this momentum (which must be large enough to allow overlap between the momenta for up and for down
in order for the measurement to be weak, and the final polarisation state to not have changed too far) means that these positions
must overlap heavily too. While, in the limit of many identically-prepared photons, we could obtain information about whether
the polarisation-state was |𝐻⟩, |𝑉 ⟩, or a superposition of the two, we cannot gain this for a single run without inducing collapse.
Therefore, a protocol built up of several of these devices, as Khoklhov’s attack protocol is, either does not work due to collapse (as
we show with the standard quantum-mechanical approach above), or gains effectively no information about the polarisation state
of the photon, making it useless as an attack.
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